Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse Except for Tax Crimes by Yochum, Mark D.
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 27 Number 2 Article 3 
1989 
Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse Except for Tax Crimes 
Mark D. Yochum 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mark D. Yochum, Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse Except for Tax Crimes, 27 Duq. L. Rev. 221 (1989). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol27/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
Duquesne Law Review
Volume 27, Winter 1989, Number 2
Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse Except for Tax
Crimes
Mark D. Yochum*
The reduction of law to slogans or aphorisms or the elevation of
commonplaces to legalities occurs with good sense. Laws are made
to be obeyed but obeisance is dependent upon the awareness and
comprehension by the object of the law. Similarly, laws are expres-
sions of understood beliefs and relationships, memorialized to give
formal effect to the collective notion. Consequently, the law is
loaded with maxims which rhythmically convey principles of gen-
eral application. These maxims, when freed of latinate bounds,
rendered in the vulgate, both describe and shape attitudes toward
the law by the unstudied. Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse is
one of these.'
That ignorance of the law provides no defense is a cornerstone in
the edifice of criminal law generally.2 While lawyers know that
mental states of various character must often be proven for convic-
tion of crime, proof of knowledge of criminality is immaterial.3 The
effect of widespread knowledge of the maxim among the unstud-
ied, however, is terror. The objective of criminal laws is to conform
conduct to their strictures. Knowledge of their provisions is critical
* B.A., 1974, Carnegie Mellon University; J.D., 1977, Georgetown University Law
Center; Associate Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law.
1. (Latin Expression) Ignorantia juris quod quisque tenetur scire, meninem excusat.
(Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no man.).
2. See Perkins, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 35 (1939).
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(9) (1985).
3. This comment, of course, excludes statutes as the tax provisions have been inter-
preted, which make knowledge of criminality a specific element of the crime. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hopkins, 744 F.2d 716 (10th Cir. 1984).
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to conformance. The maxim terrorizes us to make an effort to
know the law, for a misstep can lead to reprobation or worse, even
if we did not know the step we took was false.4
Under our constitution, the maxim is limited in effect by con-
cepts of vagueness or notice.5 Conduct which does not give fair no-
tice of its criminality cannot be prosecuted.' Yet, a step away from
these subtleties, people know (because all know the maxim) that
shady behavior may lead to jail in spite of the cry, "I didn't know
4. Oliver W. Holmes, Jr. disagrees with this interpretation.
The principle cannot be explained by saying that we are not only commanded to
abstain from certain acts, but also to find out that we are commanded. For if there
were such a second command, it is very clear that the guilt of failing to obey it would
bear no proportion to that of disobeying the principal command if known, yet the
failure to know would receive the same punishment as the failure to obey the princi-
pal law.
The true explanation of the rule is the same as that which accounts for the law's
indifference to a man's particular temperament, faculties, and so forth. Public policy
sacrifices the individual to the general good. It is desirable that the burden of all
should be equal, but it is still more desirable to put an end to robbery and murder. It
is no doubt true that there are many cases in which the criminal could not have
known that he was breaking the law, but to admit the excuse at all would be to
encourage ignorance where the law-maker has determined to make men know and
obey, and justice to the individual is rightly outweighed by the larger interests on the
other side of the scales.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 48 (1881).
While Holmes' logic for the rationale of the principle has its own elegance, the mundane
practical effect of enforcement of the maxim is that we must know the law or else. See Hart,
The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401 (1958).
5. See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1953) (definiteness requirement
under the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 2 U.S.C. § 261 et seq.) ("The constitutional
requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice that the contemplated conduct is forbidden by the stat-
ute."). The run of the mine vagueness case involves first amendment considerations, like flag
abuse. See id. at 624 n.15 for a long list, even in 1953.
6. This requirement should not be confused with the oft-argued notion as to whether
crimes which are punished by incarceration must constitutionally have as an element, mens
rea. Simply, strict liability crimes may be constitutional so long as the conduct giving rise to
criminality gives fair warning that sanctions may follow. See Stepniewski v. Gagnon, 732
F.2d 567 (7th Cir. 1984). Wholely passive conduct together with an unknowable statutory
requirement cannot support criminal prosecution under the constitution. See Lambert v.
California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957). Assuming there is no constitutional restriction on imposing
punishment without proof of mental states, a strict liability tax crime may be enforceable
given the common awareness in the citizenry of tax obligations, in spite of the fact that the
conduct producing the liability may be viewed as passive. In other words, criminal liability,
perhaps including imprisonment, may be constitutionally permissible simply for failing to
pay tax. Whether such a broad stroke is wise is another thing. The MODEL PENAL CODE
draftsmen at § 2.05 believe that strict liability has little place in criminal law as imprison-
ment implies moral condemnation. Moral condemnation is only appropriate if the "defend-
ant's act was culpable," that is, at least negligent. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 comment
(1985).
Tax Crimes
it was against the law."
Perversely, the maxim does not with force apply to the crimes
against the Federal Income Tax Code. The income tax is collected
through voluntary compliance, a fictive locution meaning a gun is
not pointed at the payor by the collector. Compliance is achieved
through simplicity in calculations and payment, through honesty
and altruism of our citizens, and through the uneasy feeling, pur-
posefully engendered by the tax collector, that his baleful eye
watches us all always, his strong arm ready to nab a transgressor
for a penalty or worse. In the achievement of the end of voluntary
compliance, the Internal Revenue Service often seeks increases in
simplicity and provides guidance and aid for the untutored. While
the Service seeks to be portrayed as it often is, human, sincere,
honest, and compassionate, it still sends shivers down spines and
turns stomachs. It is fierce, unrelenting, an enforcer of each letter
of the law. This reputation, which nauseates even the innocent tax-
payer finding an unscheduled correspondence from the collector in
his mailbox, cautions the would-be evader and produces queasily
voluntary compliance.
If voluntary compliance, so described, is so critical to the collec-
tion of the revenue, ignorance of the laws requiring the payment of
taxes should not be a defense to prosecution for crimes against the
code. In fact, as our significant federal tax crimes are written and
interpreted, ignorance is a defense, not just in the constitutional
sense of vagueness, but as the flat, unadorned lack of knowledge of
the law. While in prosecutions of tax offenders this defense, with
some small effort and care, is easily overcome, its existence is an
anomaly in an overall enforcement system designed to encourage
taxpayers to know and follow the law.
There can be no valid criticism of the cases which have inter-
preted federal tax crimes to allow ignorance of the law as an ex-
cuse, at this time; the history of the cases is long and the language
of the felony statutes, unchanged. The origin of the defense, in
part, is the word willfully, the adverb that modifies the criminal
attempt to evade tax in I.R.C. section 7201," the failure to pay tax
7. Section 7201 provides:
ATTEMPT TO EVADE OR DEFEAT TAX
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax im-
posed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties pro-
vided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not
more than $100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more
than 5 years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.
1989
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in I.R.C. section 7202,8 or the supplying of false or fraudulent in-
formation under I.R.C. section 7206.9 In United States v. Mur-
dock, 10 the Supreme Court held that a taxpayer in a criminal pros-
ecution under a predecessor to I.R.C. section 7205 was entitled to
an instruction that, in determining willfulness, the jury could con-
sider whether a refusal to comply was "in good faith and based
upon his actual belief."1 While the Court noted that willful some-
times means simply voluntarily, the Court, closer in time and dis-
position to the niceties of traditional criminal law than to modern
commerce, felt willfulness in this criminal statute requires proof of
evil motive."2
In Spies v. United States," the Court reviewed a taxpayer's con-
viction for evasion under a predecessor to I.R.C. section 7201.
Spies offered as a reason for his failures to make a return and pay
I.R.C. § 7201 (1986).
8. Section 7202 provides:
WILLFUL FAILURE To COLLECT OR PAY OVER TAX
Any person required under this title to collect, account for, and pay over any tax
imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect or truthfully account for and pay
over such tax shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a
felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or impris-
oned not more than 5 years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.
I.R.C. § 7202 (1986).
9. Section 7206 provides:
FRAUD AND FALSE STATEMENTS
(1) DECLARATION UNDER PENALTIES OF PERJUR.-Willfully makes and subscribes any
return, statement, or other document, which contains or is verified by a written decla-
ration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, and which he does not believe to
be true and correct as to every material matter. . . .shall be guilty of felony and,
upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000 ($500,000 in the case
of a corporation) or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both, together with the
costs of prosecution.
I.R.C. § 7206 (1986).
10. 290 U.S. 389 (1933) (Roberts, J.; Cardozo and Stone, JJ., dissenting without opin-
ion). I.R.C. § 7205 makes a misdemeanor of "willfully" supplying false information. The
ordinary citizen would be pressed hard to distinguish this statute from I.R.C. § 7206, save
for the severity of penalty and the surfeit of words.
11. 290 U.S. at 393.
12. Id. at 395-96. The word willfully, with this two-headed meaning, was purposely
removed from the MODEL PENAL CODE. As Judge Learned Hand told the Reporters: "It's a
very dreadful word .... It's an awful word. It's one of the most troublesome words in a
statute that I know. If I were to have the index purged, 'willful' would lead all the rest in
spite of its being at the end of the alphabet." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(10) comment n.47
(1985). The MODEL PENAL CODE defines willfully as knowingly. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(8)
(1985). This approach ostensibly removes the issue of ignorance of the law from gradations
of culpability to whether the statute requires specifically proof of knowledge of the law for
conviction.
13. 317 U.S. 492 (1943) (prosecution under § 145(b) of the Revenue Act of 1936; I.R.C.
§ 145(b)).
Tax Crimes
the tax a psychological disturbance "amounting to something more
than worry [and] something less than insanity."" The trial court
rejected this defense, essentially interpreting willfully in the stat-
ute as voluntarily. The difficulty with that interpretation, accord-
ing to the Court, was that it failed to give effect to congressional
intent, unstated but inferred, from the classification of certain tax
crimes as felonies and others as misdemeanors. 15 The perplexing
language languishes in the code today. Section 7202 provides that
one who willfully fails to pay tax is guilty of a felony. Section 7203
provides that one who willfully fails to pay tax is guilty of a misde-
meanor. If Congress had written two statutes, a difference must
exist."1
The felony in any system of criminal law which is subject to se-
verest punishment must be "the capstone of a system of sanctions
which singly or in combination were calculated to induce prompt
and forthright fulfillment of every duty under the income tax law
and to provide a penalty suitable to every degree of delin-
quency."1 7 The Court added an American touch and noted that we
culturally have an "aversion to imprisonment for debt."' 8 One
must suppose the aversion to pay taxes was too universal for men-
tion. Nonetheless, in prosecution for tax felonies, willfulness
meant, after Spies, bad motive. Further, because the word is used
in virtually every tax crime, felony and misdemeanor, willfully
came to mean commonly bad motive, "a voluntary, intentional vio-
lation of a known legal duty."' 9 Simple passive neglect, however,
was insufficient for a felony conviction. Active conduct or positive
knowledge of violation would have to be shown, two sets of books,
false entries, or, perhaps, a degree in accountancy.20 The Court in
Spies did not note as a factor to be considered in evaluating the
evilness of the taxpayer the amount of the deficiency.
14. Id. at 493.
15. Id. at 497.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 498.
19. United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360 (1973) (willfully interpreted in I.R.C. §§
7206, 7207). The loose language in the above text is a playful reference to the problems
created by Bishop, which, as cases before, referred variously and with lack of discrimination
to a requirement in willfully of "evil motive". Clever defense attorneys argued that not only
proof of knowledge of legal duty was required but some other evil motive. In United States
v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 (1976), the Court, in a sheepish per curiam opinion, settled the
controversy. Willfully done acts are voluntary, intentional violations of known legal duties.
Id. at 12.
20. Spies, 317 U.S. at 499.
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Before World War II, the incidence of the tax on the populace
and the rate of taxation was not as widespread or severe as today.2 1
In the Jazz Age there was a sense that, in the bustle of more signif-
icant enterprise, an otherwise honest citizen or, perhaps, even a
jurist, could just forget to pay his tax. Here, in the late twentieth
century, it is impossible to believe that anyone with income of any
significance does not know the government will take some share,
and even aliens must know April 15 is our day of reckoning. In the
days of Spies and Murdock and, in fact, through the drafting of
the MODEL PENAL CODE, the juridical scholars divided crimes
(again with Roman rhythm) at first between mala in se and mala
prohibita and then among crimes with mental states of culpability
and of strict liability. Strict liability crimes, crimes in which no
mental state was required to be proven, were abhorred by the
drafters of the MODEL PENAL CODE as functionally ineffective and
morally deficient. Severe punishment for crimes which were simply
mala prohibita, without proof of knowledge of the law, is morally
inappropriate.22 The type of statute examined, of course, as mala
prohibita, was the regulatory offense. The mechanism for avoiding
the moral problem, as in Murdock, was simply to interpret such a
statute as requiring proof of knowledge of criminality. What has
not occurred in the tax crime area is a recognition that, socially,
the tax obligations of the citizen have moved from an arcane regu-
latory burden to a fundamentally understood part of American life.
The Court in Spies minimized its ruling, certain that violators
deserving of felony prosecution would surely engage in other con-
duct which would brand them as felons.23 If felony prosecution,
however, is to be the "capstone" of an enforcement system which
burns the desire to comply voluntarily with the tax laws into the
soul, ignorance of that law, born of stupidity or clever non-educa-
tion, should not be a defense to the crime.
Further, although Spies clearly grounds its rationale on the no-
tion that willfully in the felony statute must mean an especially
bad motive, later courts, as noted above, have held that the word
means the same in misdemeanor prosecutions. In Sansone v.
21. Clearly in the early days of the tax, barely a single percent of the populace paid
tax and its incidence fell with the modest severity of an innocent age on the top several
percent of those with income. Of course, the rich still bitterly complained. See G. PERRET,
AMERICA IN THE TWENTIES 131 (1982).
22. See Hart, supra note 4, at 419-20.
23. Spies, 317 U.S. at 499.
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United States,2 ' the Court held that a defendant charged under
I.R.C. section 7201 was not entitled to a lesser included offense in-
struction. Sansone argued that his failure to pay was not willful in,
what he argued to be, the felonious sense because he intended to
pay when he was financially able; he conceded he purposefully did
not include an item of gain on his return which would have in-
creased his liability. The Court concluded that a lesser included
offense instruction is only appropriate where, if all the elements of
I.R.C. section 7201 have not been proven, the elements of lesser
offenses, I.R.C. section 7203 in this case, have been. The Court
held that affirmative commission of the act and knowledge of the
taxability of the item is sufficient under both statutes; if the act
was not thusly willful, he was innocent under both.25 Spies was
distinguished because the Court in that case had gushed that the
felony prosecution requires more evil conduct than simply an
I.R.C. section 7203 violation.26
The judicial history of the interpretation of these tax crime stat-
utes has not been a procession of ordered logic. In any case, the
development of the law from Spies onward (which Congress has
done nothing to stunt) has been toward an interpretation which
encourages ignorance and charlatanry. "[I]t [is] irreconcilably in-
consistent to say in one breath that guilty knowledge of the conse-
quences of the act done is the essence of the offense, and in the
next breath say that ignorance of the consequences of those acts is
no excuse."27 In the United States, individuals know they have in-
come tax obligations; if confusion exists, competent advice should
be sought. If they fail to seek that advice because of stupidity or a
sub rosa belief that they will learn they have to pay, full criminal
sanctions should be able to be brought against them.
That ignorance of the law as a defense should be modified or
reduced is justified in several respects. First, many who are unedu-
cated in the law but aware of the maxim think ignorance is without
avail. Thus, only the crafty and the prosecuted bring ignorance to
their defense. Further, if the great trickle down theory of prosecu-
tions' effects on general conduct is valid, harsher treatment will
lead to an urgency to comply. The moral bankruptcy of societal
24. 380 U.S. 343 (1965).
25. Id. at 353.
26. Id. at 351.
27. Haigler, 49-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) V 9171 at 162 (10th Cir. 1949) (reversing convic-




sanction of crimes with limited culpability in terms of mental state
would not be present. As with the crime of murder, general tax
obligations are so well-known that taking liberties with them pro-
duces in the good citizen a sense of rashness akin to the sense of
temerity in the taking of liberties with others' lives and limbs. Of
course, the argument in this area is somewhat circular. If everyone
knows the law such that we are justified in eliminating the require-
ment that everyone know the law, why do we need to eliminate the
requirement to encourage knowledge? An examination of the use
of the defense will illustrate in part how that circle does not fully
close.
The first consequence of this interpretation of the requirement
of willfulness is that, as a description of mental state, proof of sub-
jective intent is required. For example, in United States v. Ait-
ken,28 the First Circuit considered, in a prosecution under I.R.C.
section 7203 and I.R.C. section 7205, whether willfulness meant a
subjective intent to disobey the law or "merely the absence of what
a jury would consider an objectively reasonable ground for failure
to comply."29 The trial court had instructed the jury that a mis-
taken belief must be reasonably held; the taxpayer did not file re-
turns and had filed false W-4's, thinking he owed nothing because
he did not believe an exchange of time (his) for money created in-
come. His conviction was vacated by the First Circuit because will-
fulness must be evaluated subjectively." The outrageousness of the
belief should certainly influence the jury's determination as to
whether the belief is actually held, but if held, the taxpayer is
innocent.
While the uninitiated may lump all of the law in the category of
the vague and unknowable, the tutored realize that the laymen's
perception of vagueness is actually a haze from the shimmer of
complexity. Rarely have courts struck down prosecutions for tax
crimes based upon vagueness. 1 The regulatory authority of the
28. 755 F.2d. 188 (1st Cir. 1985) (Coffin, J.).
29. Id. at 189.
30. Id. at 193-94. The conclusion is unassailable and has been adopted by virtually
every circuit which has had occasion to consider the matter. See United States v. Philips,
775 F.2d 262 (10th Cir. 1985). Note, however, the discussion of United States v. Moore, 627
F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1980), below.
31. Tax protesters, for example, have urged the device of filing false (a legal conclusion
the protestors must be careful not to draw overtly) W-4's, claiming the western world as
dependents or some other group which will eliminate withholding. These groups roamed the
mid-West in the mid-seventies, speaking before farm groups or others of the put-upon. See,
e.g., United States v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1978) (Prosecution under I.R.C. § 7205
Vol. 27:221
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Treasury is exercised with sufficient vigor that technical matters
are explained and fora are provided for disagreement and discus-
sion short of criminal prosecution. Typical violations of tax crimes
are produced by transgressions of the simplest statutes, not from
deep code subsections. The tax criminal is the common criminal
who pays no tax on ill gotten gains, the tax adept who knows what
cheating is and how to do it, and the tax protestor who clutters the
courts with asininity, risking incarceration while spreading, unfor-
tunately, the gospel of the inane.
The government has argued, with little success, that a good faith
belief to be a defense must be objectively reasonable. In United
States v. Burton,s2 the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the
taxpayer's conviction under I.R.C. section 7203 and I.R.C. section
7205 because the trial court instructed the jury that the defend-
ant's belief that wages were not income was no defense. The Fifth
Circuit noted, with a wistful tone of sympathy, that trial judges
dislike this rule because defendants may escape justice through de-
ceptive arguments and may confuse juries as to what the tax law
is.33 Further, the court noted, with what must be the Treasury's
hope, "a jury is the ultimate discipline to a silly argument."34
The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Moore,35 suggested the
trial court could withdraw from the jury's consideration a misun-
derstanding of the law defense if that misunderstanding was objec-
tively unreasonable. In that case, a tax protestor was prosecuted
for failure to file, his returns containing only his name, address and
social security number but none of the other numbers which are
sought with more gravity. He said dollars were worthless and his
tax return, adequate. The trial court instructed the jury that will-
(1954)) (Taxpayer argument that "two thousand pages of regulations are too vague to be
understood by the ordinary citizen," rejected); United States v. Echols, 677 F.2d 498 (5th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 906 (1978). Because of the structure of our tax crimes,
courts cannot decide as a matter of law that ignorance of an obligation to pay some tax on
wages is no defense whereas the common sense of the matter is that every citizen actually
knows the tax falls on nearly every worker. Convictions under I.R.C. § 7206(1), (2), were
reversed on vagueness grounds in United States v. Mallas, 762 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1985). In
that case, the taxpayer used deductions in a coal tax shelter scheme (annual minimum roy-
alties) to reduce other income. The court held that the basis for the Service's determination
that the deduction was not allowed, I.R.C. Reg. § 1.612-3(b), was vague. At the time, there
were no cases or other construction of the rule but the Service argued its conclusion was
compelled by common sense.
32. 737 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1984).
33. Id. at 442-43.
34. Id.
35. 627 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981).
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fully meant the violation of a known legal duty, but also added
that "the question is, did he reasonably believe" the returns were
adequate.3 e Arguably this latter comment was in error because it
places upon the taxpayer the additional burden of proving his be-
lief is reasonable when the real issue is whether the belief was ac-
tually held. The Seventh Circuit held that "the mistake of law de-
fense is extremely limited and the mistake must be objectively
reasonable. 3 7 How could anyone reasonably believe dollars are
worthless?
While one must have sympathy with the common sense of
Moore, its statement of the law is simply wrong.38 Where the Sev-
enth Circuit fell into error is in the great nether world of mistake
of law and fact defenses. Simply, as defined by the Supreme Court,
tax crimes require as an element of criminality, knowledge of the
legal duty. There is no requirement that lack of knowledge, which
may be manifested by some conduct which is believed to be con-
forming, be reasonable.39 A defense which is not allowed is disa-
greement with the law, which is not a mistake or ignorance but an
act of civil disobedience. 40 A taxpayer cannot interpose his belief
that the revenue is being collected from him for an improper pur-
pose as a defense to evasion. But if a mistaken belief is held, how-
ever wild and weird, that he does not owe taxes, he must be
acquitted.
One facet of this assault on sense where courts have taken some
meager stand in reducing the force of the defense is the limitation
on the use of extrinsic evidence to establish how the taxpayer came
to his wacky conclusion. For example, in United States v. Har-
rold,4 a tax protestor who had formed the notion, from his own
research, that wages were not income, sought to present evidence
of that research. The Tenth Circuit held the evidence was properly
excluded because the reasonableness of the belief has little rele-
vance; what is relevant is whether he actually held that belief.42
This limitation on parading tax palaver before juries, however,
may not be easily preserved. The reasonableness of the belief is
36. Id. at 833.
37. Id.
38. See United States v. Philips, 775 F.2d 262 (10th Cir. 1985) (rejecting Moore).
39. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 comment 1 (1985) (discussion of similar issues
under general criminal statutes).
40. See United States v. Ware, 608 F.2d 400 (10th Cir. 1979).
41. 796 F.2d 1275 (10th Cir. 1986).
42. Id. at 1285.
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relevant in considering whether that belief is actually held. Evi-
dence of reasonableness, proffered by the taxpayer, can come in
two forms: proof of the "expert" sources upon which he relied and,
more tenuously, proof that other misguided citizens or putative ex-
perts hold that belief even though he had not relied upon them.
In United States v. Burton,43 the taxpayer sought to have a so-
called expert, a "Professor," testify. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the
trial court's exercise of discretion in excluding the testimony.
While relevant, the testimony had potential for prejudice and con-
fusion. "[Alpart from those few cases where the legal duty pointed
to is so uncertain as to approach the level of vagueness, the ab-
stract question of legal uncertainty of which a defendant was una-
ware is of marginal relevance.'" Burton had not alleged that he
had relied on the Professor.
In cases where the taxpayer has relied on the advice of others,
the primary issue still is not the validity or arguable merit of that
advice, but the personal nature of the taxpayer's reliance. Again,
the requirement of willfulness for conviction provides a possible
defense to the taxpayer who seeks out the charlatan or, more char-
itably, is seduced. In Bursten v. United States," the taxpayer who
was himself a lawyer was convicted under I.R.C. section 7201. He
argued that his return was prepared with specific advice from tax
counsel; he requested an instruction that such reliance was
grounds for acquittal. The trial court refused, saying "[t]hat's no
excuse at all for a lawyer. . ." and "[yjou can always find a crook
that will give you any advice that you don't owe any tax."' "4 The
conviction was reversed on grounds of judicial impropriety.
Reliance on counsel is a defense if there has been actual reliance
in good faith and the advice is obtained after disclosure of all facts
to which the advice pertains.47 The Eighth Circuit has held that
advice must be "competent legal advice." In United States v. Far-
ber 8 and United States v. Barney,9 the Eighth Circuit affirmed
the trial court's rejection of an instruction on the defense where
43. 737 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1984).
44. Id. at 444.
45. 395 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1968).
46. Id. at 981. The Fifth Circuit wryly took judicial notice that often common lawyers
know nothing of the practice of tax.
47. See United States v. Mitchell, 495 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1974) (conviction reversed;
reliance on Montgomery Ward tax preparer; I.R.C § 7206 (1954)); Conforte, 80-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) 1 9417 (9th Cir. 1980).
48. 630 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1980).
49. 674 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1980).
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the taxpayers' "counsel" was obtained at a tax protest seminar and
the taxpayers did not inquire as to whether the advisor was a li-
censed attorney.5
The reliance on counsel defense allows the taxpayer to plead
with specious honesty that he was uncertain or unaware as to the
correctness of his putative expert's tax decision. If the limitation
on the defense, as intimated in the Eighth Circuit to "competent
legal counsel," with the competency determined by the court, is
preserved, a determination that counsel was incompetent will lead
the taxpayer to argue that he actually believed the outrageous ad-
vice. Nonetheless, under the supervening theory of personal belief
of legal impropriety to support conviction, the Eighth Circuit's
limitation of the reliance on counsel defense to competent legal
counsel should be modified. If the taxpayer actually believes the
counsel is competent, reliance upon that counsel should be a de-
fense regardless of his actual competence.5 1 Vigorous defense coun-
sel in this treacherous movement of tax nihilism may be successful
in persuading courts that if the mental state of evilness is such a
critical element of the crime, a defendant should be permitted to
defend himself by showing fully how and why he relied on counsel,
however bizarre, or upon an idea held by others similarly twisted.
The magnitude of the problem created by this logical anomaly is
difficult to gauge. Trial courts are littered and trial judges, irri-
tated. Prosecutions are successful but time is drawn away from
what must be more meritorious pursuits. Tax protest movements
seem to blaze dementedly, then are beaten to a few radical embers,
only to flame with some new spark of insanity elsewhere.
Nonetheless, a rational system of criminal penalties to encourage
voluntary compliance should motivate the citizen to seek compe-
tent tax counsel. Further, the tax law should be recognized as suffi-
ciently branded on the American mind that citizens with certain
levels of income or types of income know they have a tax liability.
Certain citizens, who might be objectively described by deficiency
or source of income, should not be provided a defense by arguing
they did not consult counsel because they did not know they had a
tax problem.
The foregoing objectives cannot be accomplished by judicial
opinion. It is too late to say that willfully means without inadver-
50. Farber, 630 F.2d at 569, 575; Barney, 674 F.2d at 729, 732.
51. Platt, 70-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9719 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J.) (taxpayer entitled to
an instruction on reliance if there is any foundation that he thought accountant was comply-
ing with the law).
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tence, not with knowledge of criminality. The law in this area is
well-developed (in the sense of mature, not well-formed) and un-
derstood. Some statutory changes, however, might preserve the
distinctions between felonies and misdemeanors and render in
some measure ignorance of the law as no longer an excuse, all with-
out running afoul of constitutional restrictions.
In reviewing a revised criminal tax code, certain elements of the
knowledge of criminality defense must be maintained. The tax re-
sult in many situations is not free from ambiguity. For example,
the taxation of the receipt of a transfer without consideration is
subject to legal ambiguity in the sense that, under I.R.C. section
102, some receipts are excludable if they are a gift. The taxpayer
who mistakenly concludes an item was a gift should not be prose-
cuted. The taxpayer who ignorantly concludes that an item given
by his employer to him was an excludable gift should be subject to
criminal sanction. In the first instance, the law was considered but
rejected; in the second, the law was ignored. In such distinctions, it
becomes apparent that simply abrogating ignorance as a defense is
ineffective in achieving justice along with the aims of encouraging
education in the law and compliance.52
Further, affirmative disobedience of a known law should subject
an actor to greater punishment. Presently, willful evasion of tax
under I.R.C. section 7201, with its stiff punishment but greater
proof level, maintains this notion. While the constitution may not
prohibit a tax crime which punishes as a felony the voluntary fail-
ure to pay tax of a deficiency of a particular amount (without re-
gard to knowledge of the deficiency), we might wish to punish
more severely the same failure by one who knows the law.
The tax criminal provisions, unlike most of the rest of the code,
do not display an exercise in the precise use of terms. Unlike mod-
ern penal systems, the code uses a hodgepodge of terms to describe
various (and often the same) mental states or elements of crimes:
willfully, falsely, fraudulently, knowingly, corruptly. These words
are placed fitfully and irregularly and do not reflect levels of ma-
levolence which correspond to criminal culpability. In the past sev-
eral years, Congress' and the Treasury's concern has been directed
52. When ignorance of the law is a defense, a long series of mistakes by the criminal
who has offered his reliance on counsel may be examined. Even the MODEL PENAL CODE has
been unable to logically resolve this problem. Although the MODEL PENAL CODE States that
ignorance of the law is no defense, reliance on authorities is a defense. Suppose an actor errs
in judging the scope of that reliance? See Fletcher, Mistake in the Model Penal Code: A
False Problem, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 363 (1988).
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elsewhere to provide the stick for taxpayers' compliance. Our re-
form acts over the last decade have done furious work on the sys-
tem of civil penalties imposed on the taxpayer and the tax
preparer. Too often in this area, taxpayers are given the opportu-
nity to play games, evaluating the risk of getting caught, the value
of the penalty, the confusion in the law, and the profit in non-
compliance. Burdened, the Service fears these civil tools of terror
no longer frighten the citizenry into voluntary compliance. 3 Pay-
ment of taxes is not seen (if it ever was) as the purchase of civiliza-
tion, but as an inhibition on enterprise. In this twisted perspective,
the law, the tax, is viewed as the crime hampering the freedom to
flex indiscriminately some economic muscle. Disrespect for the law
ends it. At least for the tax collector, his ultimate weapon, the law
of crimes, should not be fully spiked by the ignorance of the law of
his target.
Without major reform or reorganization of the criminal statutes,
which in their present state have the moderate virtue of being
fairly well understood by lawyers in the field, a small step could be
taken to regularize the carrot of the defenses which are the prod-
uct of the excuse of ignorance. If the taxpayers are permitted the
defense of reliance on counsel, expansion of that defense may be
limited by statute. If a taxpayer raises as a defense that he relied
upon the advice of some third party, he should prove: (1) reliance
in good faith; (2) full disclosure of material facts; and (3) the advi-
sor was a licensed attorney, taxpreparer, or certified public ac-
countant. Further, as to this last requirement, while the most ef-
fective rule would be to require that the advisor actually be so
licensed, the law might be drafted to at least provide that the tax-
payer make a reasonable effort to determine licensure.
More aggressive would be a provision requiring taxpayers argu-
ing that they had a belief about the tax law to establish that belief
as not only subjectively held, but objectively reasonable. Such a
provision might modify the result in current tax cases such that
the protestor who argues the sixteenth amendment is unconstitu-
tional would not be permitted to parade the notion before a jury,
but the recipient of the putative gift posited above might have his
argument considered.
Piecemeal renovation of the tax code's criminal provisions is not
the most desirable approach, while overall recodification is a possi-
53. The Service's Tax Force on Civil Penalties is currently examining these issues. See
IRS Official Discusses New Penalty Study, Taxnotes at 1371 (June 20, 1988).
234 Vol. 27:221
1989 Tax Crimes 235
bility. The code's crimes should be reconsidered now that the in-
come tax laws are aged, if not venerated. The crimes should not be
described or interpreted with the timidity of a young regulatory
idea sneaking up on an unsuspecting public, but as social obliga-
tions as familiar as "thou shalt not steal." The greatest threat to
voluntary compliance comes when no public disdain is heaped
upon the violator. In earlier days, felony prosecutions for nascent
regulatory offenses may have been viewed as morally unjustified
because of the caution, "how was one to know the law." Felony
convictions brought down the derision of the community because a
felon had breached a fundamental tenet of his social obligations. In
those days, it was felt unjust to brand as a felon what was per-
ceived to be the inadvertent criminal. There is no justification for
treating income tax obligations as mere regulations. People who
fail to consider their tax obligations are felons and deserve the dis-
respect of us all.

